SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
NEW JERSEY AND THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey Supreme Court and Third Circuit cases of interest to
practitioners. In so doing we hope to assist the legal community in
keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in significant
areas of practice.
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ALTERNATIVE

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION-ARBITRATION-FoR-

MER PARTNER'S CLAIM AGAINST LAW FIRM WAS SUBJECT TO PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT'S ARBITRATION PROVISION, EVEN THOUGH

FORFEITURE PROVISION CLARY VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLYING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE GOVERNING RESTRIC-

TIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE

LAw-Heher v. Smith, Stratton,

Wse,Heher & Brennan, 143 N.J. 448, 672 A.2d 1147 (1996).
In August of 1986 Garrett M. Heher, plaintiff voluntarily withdrew as a partner from the law firm of Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher
& Brennan ("SSWH&B") after approximately twenty years of practice with the firm. 142 N.J. 448, 452, 672 A.2d 1147,1149 (1996).
Heher proceeded to engage in the practice of law and several of
Heher's former clients moved with him following his withdrawal.
The SSWH&B partnership agreement ("Agreement") in effect
at the time of Heher's withdrawal contained an arbitration clause
that called for arbitration of all disputes that arose out of the partnership agreement or relationship. Id. at 451, 672 A.2d at 1150.
The Agreement called for the arbitrator's award to be "final" and
not appealable to the courts. The Agreement continued to provide that any partner who "withdrew and thereafter competed with
the firm in any way" forfeited the benefits that were available to
partners who chose to withdraw from the firm but did not
compete.
The SSWH&B Agreement provided for two separate types of
benefits for partners who withdrew from the partnership. Id. at
452-53, 672 A.2d at 1149-50. The Agreement defined the "stated
benefit," as "an amount equal to the average of the partner's annual compensation from the firm ...for the five (5) consecutive
years next before the firm year in which his interest in the firm was
terminated." Id. at 453, 672 A.2d at 1149. The "supplemental benefit," was defined as "twenty percent (20%) of the gross fees received in each such year from the clients of the terminated
partner." Id., 672 A.2d at 1149-50. The supplemental benefit was
to be paid over the three years following the partner's withdrawal
and only if the gross fees received from that partner's clients during the two years immediately following the partner's withdrawal
equaled at least two times the amount of the entire stated benefit
paid to the withdrawing partner. Id., 677 A.2d at 1150. Heher,
after effecting his withdrawal from the firm, notified SSWH&B that
he intended to arbitrate certain disputes that arose as a result of his
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withdrawal, pursuant to Article V of the Agreement. The parties
never initiated arbitration proceedings.
Defendants Robert A. White and Todd D. Johnston, partners
in SSWH&B, withdrew from the firm in 1987 and joined a competing New Jersey law firm. In late 1987, White and Johnston requested arbitration on several issues that included whether they
were entitled to the "stated benefit" under the Agreement. Id. at
453-54, 672 A.2d at 1150. During the arbitration, White andJohnston expressly raised the issue of whether the forfeiture provision
contained in the agreement was enforceable. In February of 1992
the arbitrators issued their decision and made several awards to
White and Johnston on a number of contested issues. The arbitrator's award, however, held the forfeiture provision valid and denied White and Johnston their "stated benefits." On April 23,
1992, after a modification of the arbitration award, SSWH&B issued White and Johnston checks in satisfaction of the amount
owed.
In August of 1992 Heher filed a complaint in the Chancery
Division of the Superior Court against SSWH&B and several current and former members of the firm, including both White and
Johnston. Id. at 454, 672 A.2d at 1150. In his complaint, Heher
asserted that the forfeiture provision contained in the Agreement
was against public policy and therefore void. Id. Heher further
averred that because the non-compete provision of the Agreement
was void, the issue is not subject to binding, non-appealable arbitration as dictated in the Agreement. Id. Therefore, Heher concluded that he was entitled to his "stated benefit" in accordance
with the Agreement and that the issue presented in this case was
subject to the jurisdiction of the court system. Id.
SSWH&B filed a motion to dismiss Heher's complaint, or in
the alternative, to stay the court proceedings pending the outcome
of an arbitration on the issue of Heher's entitlement to the benefits as dictated in the Agreement. Id. at 455, 672 A.2d at 1150.
Heher, in response, "filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
on the issue of the arbitrability of the dispute and also on his claim
for the stated benefit plus prejudgment interest, fees, and costs."
Id., 672 A.2d at 1150-51. Defendants White andJohnston filed motions to dismiss the complaint as to them. Id., 672 A.2d at 1151.
The Superior Court, Chancery Division, held that the forfeiture provision contained in the Agreement was void and that the
issue of whether Heher was entitled to compensation under the
Partnership Agreement was not arbitrable. Id. The court did note,
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however, that if the parties to the action were in conflict as to the
compensation due, the amount of prejudgment interest, or the potential liability of certain individual partners, then arbitration
would be proper. Id. Finally, the court denied SSWH&B's motion
to dismiss and withheld decision on the cross-motion for summary
judgment. Id.
SSWH&B moved for a reconsideration of its motion to dismiss
Heher's complaint. Id. Defendants White and Johnston filed an
answer to the complaint with the court along with a cross-claim
against SSWH&B for their "stated benefits" under the partnership
agreement. Id. at 456, 672 A.2d at 1151. White and Johnston
sought a nullification of the 1992 arbitration award denying them
their "stated benefits" and sought indemnification by SSWH&B in
the event that they became personally liable to Heher for the monies owed to him. Id.
The trial court granted in part and denied in part SSWH&B's
motion for reconsideration. Id. The court confirmed its prior ruling that the provision calling for forfeiture was void as a matter of
public policy, but ordered arbitration of all other disputed issues.
Id. Additionally, the court partially granted Heher's motion for
summary judgment finding that the amount of the "stated benefit"
owed to Heher under the partnership agreement was $143,355. Id.
The court referred all other issues present in the case to arbitration
directing the arbitrators to make express findings of fact and to
state all reasons for their conclusions on all the issues. Id. As to
defendants White and Johnston, the trial court denied their motion for summary judgment against SSWH&B, but granted their
cross-motion to dismiss the complaint as to them because Heher's
claims did not ensue until after White and Johnston left the partnership. Id. at 457, 672 A.2d at 1151. Heher filed an appeal of the
trial court's decision and sought to stay any arbitration while the
appeal was pending. Id. The trial court granted Heher's motion to
stay the arbitration pending the appeal. Id., 672 A.2d at 1152.
The Superior Court, Appellate Division, in an unpublished
opinion, concluded that arbitrators are not prevented from resolving issues that implicate public policy and that the trial judge
should have stayed all the proceedings springing from Heher's
complaint pending arbitration of all matters. Id. The court noted,
however, that despite the arbitration provision contained in the
partnership agreement, the decision of the arbitrator would be
subject to review by the judiciary. Id. (citing Faherty v. Faherty, 97
N.J. 99, 109-10, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984); Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitz-
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patrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 364, 640 A.2d 788 (1994)).
The appellate division, therefore, reversed the trial court's denial
of SSWH&B's motion to stay the court proceedings and issued an
order for the arbitration to proceed. Id. Additionally, the court
reversed the dismissal of Heher's complaint as to White and Johnston and affirmed the dismissal of their cross-claim for "stated benefits" under the partnership agreement. Id. at 458, 672 A.2d at
1152.
Heher filed a petition for certification seeking review of the
appellate division's determination that arbitration should proceed
on all issues. Id. Additionally, defendants White and Johnston
filed a cross-petition for certification seeking review of the appellate division decision. Id. Upon granting both petitions for certification, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
division's decision. Id. The court held that, despite the public policy questions implied in Heher's challenge to the soundness of the
forfeiture provision, the disputes must first advance to arbitration
so as guarantee that the parties respect their contractual obligation
to arbitrate. Id. at 460, 672 A.2d at 1152-53.
Justice Stein, writing for the majority, recognized that Heher's
claims, including that of the primary issue in the case - whether the
provision calling for arbitration in the "partnership agreement is
enforceable if the pending dispute" violates a clear edict of public
policy - must proceed to arbitration. Id. at 459, 672 A.2d at 1152.
The justice noted that this conclusion is reinforced by the court's
longstanding confidence in the arbitration process and in the capability of arbitrators to decide disputes in a custom consistent with
mandates of public policy. Id. (citing Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett
& Morrissey, 143 N.J. 420, 440-41, 672 A.2d 1132, 1143 (1996)).
Additionally, Justice Stein stated, the disposition of the arbitrator,
under existing New Jersey case law, will undergo an amplified level
of judicial analysis in order to provide sufficient relief from an
award that clearly frustrates public policy. Id. (citing Weiss, 143
N.J. at 442, 672 A.2d at 1444) (other citations omitted). The majority noted that by requiring the dispute to proceed to arbitration
first, the parties' contractual intent to arbitrate conflicts would be
honored and the court system would still be able to override any
award that violated a distinct mandate of public policy. Id. at 460,
672 A.2d at 1153.
When dealing with issues other than the legitimacy of a forfeiture provision that is to be presented to an arbitrator, the majority
noted that the reference to the possible use of estoppel principles
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to prohibit a partner from confronting an otherwise defective forfeiture provision found in Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 128
NJ. 10, 607 A.2d 142 (1992) was clarified in the court's opinion in
Weiss. Id. (citing Weiss, 143 N.J. at 447, 672 A.2d at 1146). The
justice commented that the statement in Jacob alluded only to the
rare and inexplicable exercise of dominion by a primary partner in
a law firm who exercised a controlling authority in persisting that
the forfeiture provision be administered against withdrawing partners. Id.
Justice Stein continued by noting that the majority of the
court was in agreement with the appellate division's opinion that
Heher's demands against White and Johnston also must be determined through arbitration. Id. The justice opined that, although
White and Johnston's possible culpability to Heher is secondary to
that of the general partnership's, theirjoinder as parties in the action that sought the establishment of the partnership's liability is
both proper and congruous with the entire controversy doctrine.
Id. Finally, the justice noted that the majority fully agreed with the
appellate division's dismissal of White and Johnston's cross-claim
seeking to vacate the 1992 arbitration award. Id. at 460-61, 672
A.2d at 1153. The court stated that White and Johnston failed to
observe the timing rules set forth by the court to vacate an arbitration award. Id. at 461, 672 A.2d at 1153.
In a separate opinion, Justice O'Hern concurred in both the
opinion and the judgment of the majority insofar as it mandated
arbitration of the contractual conflict dependent on the level of
scrutiny set forth in the court's opinion. Id., 672 A.2d at 1153-54
(O'Hern, J., concurring and dissenting). The justice then noted,
however, disagreement with the majority's decision insofar as it
subjected defendants White and Johnston to the province of the
arbitrators for affliction of liability under the agreement without
allowing the arbitrators to contemplate any of the other issues
which were brought forth. Id., 672 A.2d at 1154.
The NewJersey Supreme Court's decision that disputes involving partnership agreements are subject to arbitration, even where
questions of public policy are involved is significant. Law firms that
have arbitration clauses in their agreements can rest assured that
they will be enforceable in many, if not all, partnership disputes.
The court's decision strongly favors law firms because arbitration as a means of dispute resolution will essentially prevent public
knowledge of private disputes regarding obligations and duties of
law firms and their members. The decision, however, appears to
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be a major setback for a withdrawing partner who seeks to challenge an unethical provision of a partnership agreement. That
partner must initially pursue an arbitration proceeding, wasting
needless money and time, in order to subsequently challenge any
adverse award, along with the unethical provision, in the courts.
The only guidance offered by the court in the decision addresses the level of review the judiciary will use when looking at an
arbitration award dealing with questions of public policy. Through
extension of prior precedent from several different areas of law the
court stated that arbitration cases involving public policy questions
will be subjected to some sort of enhanced judicial review. Id. at
457, 672 A.2d at 1152 (citations omitted).
William F. Clarke,Jr.

TITLE VII-SEx

DISCRIMINATION-BONA

FIDE

OCCUPATIONAL

QUALITY DEFENSE AFFORDS EMPLOYERS THE RIGHT TO CONSIDER
GENDER IN EMPLOYMENT POLICIES WITHOUT ILLEGALLY DISCRIM-

INATING AGAINST EMPLOYEEs-Healey

v. Southwood Psychiatric

Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996).
The plaintiff, Healey, was hired by the Southwood Psychiatric
Hospital ("Southwood") as a child care specialist in October 1987.
78 F.3d at 130. At Southwood, Healey was in charge of creating
and sustaining a therapeutic environment for the children and adolescents. The patients at Southwood are emotionally disturbed
and some have endured sexual abuse.
In November 1992, as a result of a staff reorganization due to a
decline in patient population, Healey was assigned to work the
night shift. The night shift was less desirable because there was little interaction with patients and a myriad of housekeeping chores
that had to be completed. Southwood acknowledged that male
and female employees were scheduled to all shifts and that when
necessary, gender was taken into consideration. In November
1992, Southwood explained that Healey was assigned to the night
shift because a female child care specialist was needed. Southwood
claimed that the gender-based policy was necessary to accommodate the privacy and needs of its mixed-gender population. Healey
alleged that Southwood's night shift assignment constituted sex
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discrimination under Title VII, maintaining that gender should
not play a role in Southwood's scheduling or hiring of employees.
In a unanimous opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to Southwood.
Id. at 128. The court found that neither the disparate impact theory nor the McDonnell Douglas framework was applicable to Healey's claim. Id. The Third Circuit concluded, however, that
Southwood proved that a "Bona Fide Occupational Quality"
("BFOQ") defense existed for its facially discriminatory staffing
and scheduling policy. Id.
Writing for the court, Judge Cowen began the analysis by discussing the theories of liability available to Healey under a Tide VII
claim. Id. at 131. Judge Cowen recognized that under a Title VII
sex discrimination claim, the two theories of liability available to
the plaintiff were disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. Id. The judge further explained that the disparate treatment
theory could be divided into the following subtheories: facial discrimination and pretextual discrimination.
Id. Furthermore,
Judge Cowen posited that a different affirmative defense may be
offered to counter the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories of liability. Id. The judge articulated that in a disparate
treatment case, an affirmative defense for the defendant was that
the specific policy, practice, or action was based on a BFOQ. Id.
Judge Cowen stated, however, that in a disparate impact case the
appropriate affirmative defense for the defendant was that of business necessity. Id. (citing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198-200 (1991); Grant v. General Motors Corp.,
908 F.2d 1303, 1307 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Judge Cowen observed that the district court, in dismissing
Healey's claim, did not address the disparate impact issue in the
claim. Id. The judge noted that Healey argued the applicability of
both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. Id.
Judge Cowen stated that the disparate impact theory was not relevant to Healey's circumstance. Id. The court explained that
Southwood used gender as a critical factor when assigning employees to various shifts and that Healey was designated to the night
shift because of her gender. Id. The judge posited that under the
disparate impact theory, liability occurred when a facially neutral
policy of the employer affected members of a protected class in a
substantially discriminatory manner. Id. Judge Cowen observed
that Southwood's staffing policy was facially discriminatory, not
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facially neutral. Id. Therefore, the court recognized that analysis
under the disparate impact theory of liability was not appropriate if
a plaintiff claimed injury based on an employer's facially discriminatory policy. Id. Because the case involved Southwood's facially
discriminatory employment policy, not a facially neutral policy, the
judge concluded that a disparate impact theory was not applicable.
Id.
Turning to Healey's disparate treatment claim, Judge Cowen
explained that the district court had applied the McDonnell Douglas
test for shifting burdens of proof and determined that Healey
failed to prove that Southwood's BFOQ defense was pretextual. Id.
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
The judge articulated, however, that Southwood's gender-based
policy was per se intentional discrimination rather than a pretext
for discrimination. Id. This type of disparate treatment case, the
court reasoned, was distinguishable from the typical pretextual discrimination case where the familiar analysis under McDonnell Douglas was befitting. Id. Therefore, the judge concluded that the
McDonnell Douglas test was not applicable to the case at bar that
involved a facially discriminatory policy. Id. at 131-32 (citing Reidt
v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1341 (7th Cir. 1992); In
re Pan American World Airways, Inc., 905 F.2d 1457, 1460 (11th
Cir. 1990); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 704
n.18 (8th Cir. 1987)).
Judge Cowen explained that Healey could establish sex discrimination under her Title VII claim absent the McDonnellDouglas
shifting burdens of proof analysis. Id. at 132. Moreover, the court
agreed that Healey had already established sex discrimination by
the existence of Southwood's facially discriminatory employment
policy. Id. Judge Cowen noted that Title VII sets forth a broad
prohibition against gender-based discrimination in the workplace,
as it states: "[it] shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ...to discriminate against any individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex[.]"
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)). Furthermore, the judge reasoned that when an employer openly and explicitly used gender as a determinant, the systematic discrimination was deemed admitted and the case would
turn on whether the employer was justified under Title VII to connote such disparate treatment. Id. One such justification, Judge
Cowen explained, was that discrimination existed and was legal be-
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cause the disparate treatment was justified under an affirmative action program or was based on a BFOQ. Id.
Southwood claimed that its gender-based staffing policy was
exempt under Title VII because it was a necessary BFOQ. Id. The
court articulated that if the BFOQ was reasonably essential to the
normal operations of the business or enterprise, then such overt
gender-based discrimination was excused. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (e) (1)). Judge Cowen asserted that the Supreme Court
had traditionally read the BFOQ defense narrowly. Id. (citingJohnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 187, 201). Moreover, the court explained that the BFOQ provision was interpreted by the Supreme
Court to mean that discrimination was allowable only when the
particulars of the job that required the alleged discrimination fell
into the "essence" of the particular business or enterprise. Id. (citingJohnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 206). The Supreme Court also
reasoned, the judge explained, that sex discrimination was only
valid if the essence of the business entity would be undermined if
the business removed the discriminatory policy. Id. (citing
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977)).
The court next addressed the issue of the BFOQ defense and
posited that Southwood had the burden of proving such defense.
Id. Judge Cowen proffered that the employer must prove the existence of a "basis in fact" that members of one gender could not
perform the job in question. Id. The court duly recognized that
such assessments need not be based on objective, empirical evidence, but rather common sense and expert opinions may be utilized. Id. Furthermore, the judge stated that the employer must
demonstrate an inability to arrange job responsibilities in a manner which would minimize tension between the patient's privacy
interest and the non-discriminatory convictions of Title VII. Id.
Turning to the facts of the case, Judge Cowen discerned that
the essence of Southwood's business was to care for children and
adolescents who were emotionally disturbed or who had been sexually abused. Id. The court stipulated that Southwood presented
expert testimony explaining that both male and female employees
on all shifts were necessary to provide therapeutic care for the patients. Id. at 133. Moreover, the expert stated that being a role
model was an important element of the employee's job at
Southwood and that a male could serve better as a male role model
and a female could serve better as a female role model. Id. Furthermore, the court articulated that a balanced staff was critical
because children who had been sexually abused would divulge
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their problems to a member of a certain sex, depending on the
child's sex and the gender of the sexual abuser. Id. The court
asserted that if both males and females were not on each shift,
Southwood would be unable to provide basic therapeutic care
which would impede the normal operation of its business. Id.
Therefore, the judge concluded that it was reasonably necessary for
Southwood, as part of its normal business operations, to have one
member of each sex accessible to patients at all times. Id. Moreover, the judge asserted that Southwood, through its panel of experts, had established a basis in fact that the therapeutic needs of
the children required consideration of gender. Id.
The court also reasoned that in addition to Southwood's therapeutic goals, privacy issues justified the discriminatory staffing policy. Id. Judge Cowen claimed that Southwood established that
adolescent concerns such as hygiene, menstruation, and sexuality
issues were discussed more openly with a care specialist of the same
sex. Id. Moreover, the judge articulated that Southwood's patients
were often accompanied to the bathroom and even bathed. Id.
Judge Cowen explained that the Supreme Court had left open the
question of whether sex constituted a BFOQ where privacy issues
were concerned and that the issue had been raised in the Third
Circuit but not yet decided. Id.
The court concluded that Southwood was an institution where
gender of employees played a significant role in the successfulness
of child care because of the therapeutic and privacy concerns of
the patients. Id. at 134. Judge Cowen asserted that Southwood
could not rearrange job responsibilities to spare Healey or other
female staff members from working the night shift because at least
one female and one male had to be accessible at all times in order
for Southwood to meet its child care needs. Id. Accordingly, the
court held that the essence of Southwood's patient care would be
in jeopardy if it could not staff at least one male and one female
employee on each shift. Id.
The court entertained Healey's allegation that the district
court erred because it weighed one expert's testimony more than
another. Id. Healey claimed that Patrice Michalski's affidavit,
from the Merck Multiple Disabilities Program ("Merck"), was credible and raised distrust as to Southwood's BFOQ defense. Judge
Cowen, however, disagreed with Healey citing that the two institutions differed significantly. Id. First, the court affirmed that
Michalski's affidavit stated that gender was not taken into consideration in her staffs ability to assist patients at the Merck. Id.
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Second, the court emphasized that Merck treated patients
ranging from three to twenty-four years old who were mentally retarded and whose developmental age was at a lower level than their
chronological age. Id. In contrast, Judge Cowen observed that
Southwood's goal was to treat children and adolescents who were
emotionally disturbed or had been sexually abused. Id. The judge
asserted that Southwood's therapeutic care depended on the staff
interacting more as role models, as opposed to the more concrete
behavior modification that was needed at Merck. Id. Therefore,
the court concluded that the essence of the two institutions differed in terms of their operations. Id. Furthermore, Michalski's
affidavit, the judge explained, expressed no opinion concerning
the staffing issues at Southwood where the patients were emotionally disturbed. Id.
The court also acknowledged Healey's argument that consideration of a qualified health care professional was not necessary
because care specialists had the ability to care for either sex. Id.
Judge Cowen explained that Healey failed to provide any expert
testimony or evidence of this theory and the court was unable to
find any support in the record. Id. The court admitted that Healey's allegation had surface appeal and that in most situations men
and women should be afforded the opportunity to carry out ajob
when each were equally qualified. Id. In fact, Judge Cowen asserted that Title VII provided women the legal basis for the choice
to undertake jobs that were traditionally restricted because of
predisposed gender stereotypes. Id. The judge admitted, however,
that in some limited circumstances an employer must consider sex
in its employment policies to ensure the lasting vitality of a business
operation. Id.
In conclusion, Judge Cowen recognized that the district court
erred by placing the burden of proof on Healey, instead of requiring Southwood to prove its BFOQ defense. Id. The court reiterated that the district court incorrectly allowed Southwood to meet
its burden of production under the McDonnell Douglas test, a lower
standard of proof compared to the requirements for the BFOQ
defense. Id. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the district court's
decision to grant summary judgment because Southwood had
presented a compelling "basis of fact" for its BFOQ defense, and
Healey offered no evidence that created a material question of fact.
Id. at 134-35. Therefore, the court held that Southwood's BFOQ
defense justified its discriminatory employment policy practices.
Id. at 135. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's sum-
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mary judgment order in favor of Southwood Psychiatric Hospital.
Id.
With this decision, the Third Circuit may have helped to stop
scorned employees from bringing frivolous Title VII claims into
our already over-burdened judicial system. In the case sub judice,
Healey was distraught over being forced to a work night shift and
sought to remedy her dissatisfaction in the courtroom rather than
amicably settling the situation with her employer, Southwood. Not
only is Southwood's gender-based discriminatory scheduling policy
appropriate in the child care specialist context of their institution,
it is necessary for the health and welfare of the patients. It is not
unreasonable for an employer, such as Southwood, to promote
scheduling decisions based on the premise that a child who was
emotionally or sexually abused by one sex may find comfort in confiding in the opposite gender during their healing process.
Title VII was not promulgated to resolve petty disputes such as
the one in this case. Instead, it was enacted to ensure equality of
employment opportunities and to dissuade the stereotype that certain occupations were only meant to be performed by a particular
group. Healey abused the statute by using it as a sword against
Southwood when there was a minor scheduling disappointment
which could have been resolved in a timely manner. Healey may
have had a viable and worthwhile claim if Southwood only scheduled women during the night shift. However, this was not the case
as there was always at least one male and one female on call during
all shifts.
Why does it matter that Healey sought retribution in court?
Healey's actions speak loud and clear to the legislature and in the
future, women and other minorities may pay the price for abuse of
the protection wielded under Title VII. After all, who wants to advocate more legislative protection if it perpetuates frivolous claims
and endangers those with genuine claims from receiving prompt
justice. Perhaps, this decision will better protect the interest of
those parties who have germane Title VII claims and will deter contemptuous employees, like Healey, from abusing the legal system
as an outlet for mere frustrations instead of serious well-founded
legal allegations.
Rachel L. Diehl
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LABOR LAW-THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938-THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S DISCIPLINARY POLICY SUBJECT-

ING

ITS

ENGINEERS

RELATED INFRACTIONS

TO

PAY REDUCTIONS

FOR

NON-SAFETY

DEEMED THE ENGINEERS UNQUALIFIED

FOR THE EXEMPTION TO THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF

1938, WHICH ALLOWS EMPLOYERS TO EXEMPT THEIR PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES FROM OVERTIME COMPENSATION REQUIRE-

MENTS-Balgowan v. State of New Jersey, Dep't of Transp., No. 955276, 1996 WL 255930 (3d Cir. May 16, 1996).
Plaintiffs, thirty-seven engineers, filed suit against its employer,
the New Jersey Department of Transportation ("DOT"), claiming
that they were entitled to overtime compensation in accordance
with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq. 1996 WL 255930, at *13. The FLSA provides, with
certain exemptions, that if an employee is retained by an employer
for longer than forty hours in a workweek, that employee must receive compensation for that additional time at a rate "'not less
than one and one-half times"' her regular rate. Id. at *15 (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). Exempt from the FLSA are administrative,
executive and professional employees.
(citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a) (1)).
DOT engineers are not compensated for overtime at the time
and a half rate, rather, they are paid in accordance with state regulations. Id. at *14 (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. , § 4A:3-5.1 et seq.
(1995)). These regulations stipulate that DOT engineers are to be
compensated for overtime pursuant to one of the following rates:
a rate for special projects approved by the Department of Personnel; a rate for emergency situations; and compensatory time paid
by the hour.
Like other DOT employees, DOT engineers are subject to the
DOT's disciplinary policy. This policy permits suspension without
pay if an employee commits such offenses as being tardy, insubordinate, or neglectful of her duties. No engineer has ever incurred a pay reduction under this policy. If a DOT engineer has
exhausted all compensatory time and paid leave time, she can be
docked pay "for taking time off work in increments of less than a
day." Id. at *14-15.
Plaintiffs claimed that because of the DOT's disciplinary policy, they failed to pass the Department of Labor's ("DOL") "salary
test," a test that helps to determine whether an employee satisfies
the FLSA exemption for professional employees. Id. at *13. Plain-
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tiffs sued the DOT in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking to be paid overtime in accordance with
the FLSA. Id. The district court granted the DOT's summary judgment motion, striking down the "salary test" as it applied to public
employees, including the DOT engineers. Id. The court ruled that
the salary test was not rationally related to the FLSA's objectives.
Id. In addition, the district court rendered an alternative holding,
finding that since the DOT had never deducted pay from the engineers under its disciplinary policy, the engineers satisfied the "salary test." Id. at *13-14.
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the salary test was applicable to public employees; however, because the DOT's disciplinary policy subjected DOT engineers to pay reductions for nonsafety related infractions, the DOT engineers failed to pass the
amended salary test. Id. at *27. Judge Cowen commenced the
opinion by noting that when the court reviews the lower court's
grant of summary judgment, the principle of plenary review governs. Id. at *15 (citing Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1530 (3d
Cir. 1993)). The Third Circuit acknowledged that the district
court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that it had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id.
Next, Judge Cowen examined the provisions of the FLSA. Id.
at *15-16. With regard to the "administrative, executive and professional employees" exemption, the Judge pointed out that the burden of proof lies with the employers who claim the exemption. Id.
at *15 (citing Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 197 &
n.12 (1974)). Judge Cowen added that these employers must also
show that their employees "'plainly and unmistakably'" fit within
this exemption. Id. (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361
U.S. 388 (1960)).
The Third Circuit noted that the term "administrative, executive and professional employees" was not defined under the FLSA,
rather the term was defined by the DOL "'from time to time by
regulations.'" Id. at *16. Judge Cowen explained that two tests
have emerged from DOL regulations: the "duties test" and the
"salary test." Id. Acknowledging that all parties agreed that the
plaintiff engineers satisfied the "duties test," the court recited that
the test for whether an employee is to be considered compensated
on a "salary basis" is if on a weekly or less than weekly basis she
regularly receives a predetermined amount of compensation without regard to the quantity or quality of the work performed, and
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not subject to the numbers of hours or days worked. Id. (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)).
Judge Cowen next surveyed certain exceptions in which an
employer can reduce an employee's compensation, yet still retain
the FLSA professional exemption. Id. at *16-17. The Judge illustrated that an employer still retains the exemption if an employee's
pay is docked due to the employee having absences lasting more
than one day as the result of personal reasons, or for absences resulting from disability or sickness when the employee has already
exhausted her leave time. Id. at *17 (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.118(a)(2)-(3)). Examining the other exceptions, Judge
Cowen added that penalties can be imposed for violations of significant major safety rules, and finally, that the employer does not
lose the exemption if she inadvertently docked an otherwise salaried employee's pay, but then corrected the error by subsequently
reimbursing the employee. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (5)(6)). This final exception, the court pointed out, is known as the
"window of correction" exception. Id.
Next, Judge Cowen remarked that the Supreme Court's ruling
in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority mandated that
the FLSA's overtime provisions applied to employees of the local
and state governments. Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). In contrast, the Judge recounted that the DOL's 1954 salary test dissented from local and
state public accountability regulations, which forbade public employees from receiving compensation for time not really worked.
Id. (citation omitted). As a result, Judge Cowen explained, a regulation amending the 1954 salary test was passed as an interim regulation on September 6, 1991 and promulgated by the DOL in 1992.
Id. at *18. The Third Circuit revealed that this amended regulation enunciated that a public employee could qualify for the FLSA
professional exemption even if such employee was docked pay,
pursuant to public accountability principles, for an absence less
than a day. Id. (citations omitted).
Judge Cowen referenced the district court's reliance on Service
Employees InternationalUnion, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, which
reasoned that because almost all public employees were bound by
public accountability requirements, no public employee could be
subject to the professional exemption prior to the 1992 amendment. The Judge illustrated that the 1954 salary test, as applied to
the public sector, went against the objectives of the FLSA and was
therefore invalid. Id. at *18-20 (citing Service Employees Int'l
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Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 35 F.3d 483 (9th Cir.
1994), op. amended and supplemented by 60 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 774 (1996)). The court asserted that the district court's reliance on Service Employees was misplaced regarding
the determination that the 1992 salary test was also invalid. Id. at
*20. Judge Cowen proclaimed that since the Service Employees decision "was based upon a regulatory scheme that was subsequently
amended," the reasoning in Service Employees could not be utilized
to invalidate the current version of the salary test. Id.
The Third Circuit went on to hold that the salary test as
amended is rationally related to the FLSA's objectives. Id. at *21.
Recognizing that there was only one court of appeals that had addressed this issue-that court having concluded that the amended
salary test was valid-Judge Cowen agreed and reasoned that it was
Congress' intention to exempt from the FLSA overtime regulations
those employees who were "not in any realistic sense hourly-wage
employees." Id. (citing Mueller v. Reich, 54 F.3d 438 (7th Cir.
1995); 29 U.S.C. § 541.5(d)).
Judge Cowen then focused on whether the plaintiff engineers
satisfied the FLSA professional exemption category. Id. The court
reiterated its earlier determination that the pre-amended salary
test was invalid, thereby leaving only the duties test to be satisfied.
Id. Judge Cowen stated that because the engineers admitted that
they passed the duties test, the engineers qualified for the professional exemption prior to the amended salary test, and their compensation prior to that time would not be subject to the FLSA
overtime provisions. Id.
With regard to the plaintiff engineers' exemption under the
amended salary test, the court concluded that because the DOT's
disciplinary procedures provided that engineers could receive reductions in compensation for "minor, non-safety related disciplinary infractions," the engineers failed to satisfy the amended salary
test. Id. at *22. Judge Cowen recalled that in accordance with
DOL regulations, employers are allowed to reduce an employee's
compensation for violating safety rules that are of major significance, such as smoking in prohibited areas, yet still be able to retain the employee's professional exemption. Id. The court opined
that the DOT cannot dock an engineer's pay for a minor, nonsafety related offense, while at the same time claim that the engineer falls within the professional employee exemption because she
is subject to the safety exception. Id. at *23.
The Third Circuit emphasized that under the salary test, em-
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ployees fail to satisfy the professional exemption if their pay can be
reduced solely on the basis of the quality or quantity of work performed. Id. Judge Cowen rejected the DOT's argument that because this particular provision of its disciplinary policy had never
been enforced, it should be able retain the exemption. Id. The
court recognized that there was a circuit split as to whether the
docking of pay must have actually transpired in order to keep the
employee outside of the exemption's scope. Id. Indeed, Judge
Cowen acknowledged that the Third Circuit had yet to address this
issue. Id. at *25. The court explained that some courts hold the
view that whenever there is the potential for a pay reduction, the
affected employee fails to satisfy the salary test and is, therefore,
not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Id. at *2324. In contrast, the Third Circuit commented, other courts reason
that the mere fact that an employee's pay could be reduced would
not preclude that employee from the professional exemption. Id.
at *24.
The court concluded that regardless of whether the DOT's
disciplinary policy towards the engineers' salaries was enforced, the
salaries were still contingent, rather than fixed, upon this policy
and the actual docking of pay was not necessary. Id. at *25. Judge
Cowen observed that this view more appropriately reflected reality.
Id. The Judge proffered that salaried employees are generally classified as professionals who are granted discretion in managing
their hours, and who are accountable solely for the number of
hours they may work in a workweek. Id. The court added that in
theory, those employees who are subject to having their pay
docked are considered to "lack one of the characteristics integral
to being a professional employee as set out in the DOL's regulations." Id. Judge Cowen further stated that this approach was reflective of both the remedial purpose of the FLSA and the policy
that the FLSA exemptions should be narrowly construed against
employers. Id. (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388,
392 (1960)).
Taking the DOT's argument one step further, Judge Cowen
pondered over whether it is only the employee who has been
docked or all of the employees who are subject to the disciplinary
policy that should lose the professional exemption if there is one
employee who happens to violate the disciplinary rules. Id. at *26.
The court remarked that the issue of whether an unenforced employment policy is effective is confusing. Id. The court additionally
stated that the DOT was certainly free to amend its disciplinary
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policy so that the engineers could satisfy the salary test under the
FLSA, thereby being exempt from the overtime compensation provisions. Id.
The court summarily dismissed the DOT's argument that the
"window of correction" exception to the FLSA professional exemption could be applied in the present case if the DOT were to reimburse the engineers for their docked pay and agree to subsequently
comply with the regulations. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 118(a)(6)).
Judge Cowen reminded, however, that the "window of correction"
was only applicable to inadvertent errors, which had certainly not
occurred in the case at bar. Id. at *27 (citation omitted).
Judge Garth authored a concurrence, writing separately to
add that regardless if the DOT were to revise its disciplinary policy
so that it was in accordance with the salary test, the plaintiff engineers would still continue to be subject to the overtime provisions
of the FLSA. Id. at *27-28 (Garth, J., concurring). The concurrence surmised that in accordance with precedent, the simple fact
that an employee was paid additional monies on an hourly basis
would be enough to preclude an employee from being exempt
under the FLSA. Id. at *28 (Garth, J., concurring).
Judge Garth provided examples of specific ways that salaried
employees could receive extra compensation: from commissions
on sales; percentages of sales; or bonuses. Id. at *28, 30 (Garth, J.,
concurring) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(b)). The Judge noted that
such additional payments could not be based on the amount of
overtime hours an employee worked. Id. at *30 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth referred to the court's prior decision of Brock v.
ClaridgeHotel & Casino to support the finding that hourly compensation was inconsistent with the salary basis. Id. (citing Brock v.
Claridge Hotel & Casino, 846 F.2d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1989)).
The concurrence recalled that in Brock, the court compared
extra compensation in the form of commissions, percentages, and
bonuses with that of overtime compensation based solely on the
amount of hours worked. Id. Judge Garth expounded that commissions, percentages, and bonuses provide an incentive to work
better because compensation is based on effort and work production, whereas overtime compensation simply allows workers to
work more hours in a certain time period in order to get paid the
hourly overtime compensation rate. Id. at *30, 31 (Garth, J., concurring). The Judge stressed the importance of this distinction
since "the hallmark of an executive, managerial or professional em-
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ployee is that such an employee 'must decide for [herself] the
number of hours to devote to a particular task."' Id. at *30 (Garth,
J., concurring). With regard to hourly employees, Judge Garth
proffered, it is the employer who is left with the discretion of what
tasks are worthy to be dealt with during overtime hours. Id.
Judge Garth struck down the DOT's allegation that Brock was
inapplicable to causes of action brought by public employees who
claimed that they were exempt from the FLSA. Id. at *31 (Garth,
J., concurring). The Judge pointed to decisions from other jurisdictions that have similarly read Brock to stand for the principle
that hourly overtime compensation is, for the most part, inconsistent with a salaried status. Id. (citations omitted). The concurrence articulated that those courts that do not remove an
employee from a salaried status, despite the fact that she is entitled
to overtime compensation, clearly conflict with the Brock decision.
Id. at *33 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth concluded that in
order for the DOT to even attempt to have the salary test applicable to its engineers, not only must the DOT revise its disciplinary
policy, but it must also comply with the principles of Brock. Id.
Judge Stapleton filed an opinion in which he concurred in
part and dissented in part. Id. at *34 (Stapleton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The Judge agreed with the court that
because of the DOT's disciplinary policy for non-safety related violations, the plaintiff engineers failed to come within the professional exemption to the FLSA. Id. Additionally, Judge Stapleton
dissented, claiming that the plaintiff engineers failed to meet the
exemption priorto September 9, 1991, and they should therefore
also be entitled to overtime compensation for that period. Id.
In support of this reasoning, the Judge disagreed with Service
Employees International Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, the
Ninth Circuit decision that was relied upon by the court. Id. at *3435 (Stapleton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego,
35 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 1994), op. amended and supplemented by 60 F.3d
1346 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 774 (1996)). Judge
Stapleton asserted that the decision was inconsistent with Congress' intention that the FLSA be applicable to employees of both
the public and private sectors. Id. at *35 (Stapleton, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). The Judge recalled that Service Employees held that the pre-1991 regulation was valid only for private,
not public, sector employees. Id. Judge Stapleton alternatively
proposed that the more appropriate ruling would be to proclaim
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the pre-1991 salary test "invalid as applied only to those public employees who but for the fact that they served under public accountability systems would meet the salary test." Id. at *36 (Stapleton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Stapleton commented that this proposal was indeed followed by the DOL when it
eventually amended the 1954 regulation. Id. (footnote omitted).
Emphasizing that the same disciplinary policy existed for the
plaintiff engineers both before and after 1991, the Judge argued
that the engineers should be treated as salaried employees for this
entire period. Id. at *37 (Stapleton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Stapleton contended that disciplinary policies have no connection to principles concerning the public sector,
including public accountability standards. Id. Concluding that
there was no justification for the court to strike down the pre-1991
salary test as it applied to public employees, who would fail the test
outright because of their governing disciplinary policies, Judge Stapleton recounted that the DOT's disciplinary rules were inconsistent with the professional employee FLSA exemption. Id. at *37-38
(Stapleton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
and citation omitted).
Finally, Judge Stapleton criticized the court's decision for focusing on whether invalid portions of the pre-1991 salary test could
be severed, rather than the test's applicability towards various
classes of employees. Id. at *39 (Stapleton, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Remarking that the court did not hesitate
to apply the test to public sector employees, Judge Stapleton disapproved of the court's distinction between private and public sector
employees. Id. The Judge proclaimed that the only issue in dispute was the reconciliation of public accountability principles with
the FLSA professional exemption. Id. Judge Stapleton surmised
that by erroneously allowing the plaintiff engineers to qualify for
the exemption, the court had failed to follow congressional intent.
Id. at *39-40 (Stapleton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Judge observed that that resulted in the court
"draw[ing] its line too loosely." Id. Concluding, Judge Stapleton
stated that the more appropriate ruling would be to allow pre-1991
public employers to qualify their FLSA professionally-exempt employees, while at the same time prohibiting public employers from
avoiding overtime requirements towards those employees who do
not fall within the exemption. Id. at *40 (Stapleton, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
The Third Circuit was correct in ruling that the plaintiff engi-
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neers were entitled to overtime compensation for the period after
1991. As the dissent stated, however, because the plaintiffs were
subject to the same disciplinary policy both before and after the
amended regulation, the engineers should be entitled to receive
overtime payments for this entire period. See Balgowan, 1996 WL
255930, at *34 (Stapleton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Because Congress intended that the FLSA be applicable to
all employees, regardless of whether they were employed by the
public or private sector, the court's reasoning is flawed.
When at all possible, courts should exercise deference towards
this country's elected legislators. Although the court summarily
dismisses the dissent's argument by stating that if it were to apply
the exemption to the engineers for the entire period, it would be
overreaching the scope of its judicial power, this issue has already
been addressed by Congress. For the Third Circuit to depart from
congressional intent is tantamount to judicial rulemaking.
1
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Petitioner, William Weatherwax, a white citizen of the Virgin
Islands, was convicted of second degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon by the District Court of the Virgin Islands. 77
F.3d at 1427. The jury convicting Weatherwax of killing a black
citizen of the Virgin Islands, was comprised of three white and nine
blackjurors. Id. at 1428. On the last day of the trial, Weatherwax's
relatives observed one of the white jurors carrying a newspaper
into the courtroom. Id. at 1427, 1428. The newspaper contained
an article reporting on and varying slightly from testimony heard
by the jury on the preceding day. Id. at 1427 & n.1.
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Weatherwax and his relatives reported their observations to
Weatherwax's trial counsel, MichaelJoseph. Id. at 1428-29. Weatherwax instructed Joseph to "do something about it." Id. at 1429.
Joseph explained to Weatherwax his desire to retain the juror and
the current jury because of the extremely rare composition of the
seated jury. Id. at 1430. Joseph, however, told Weatherwax and his
family that he would think about filing a motion for a mistrial.
Weatherwax alleged and Joseph denied that Joseph committed to
filing a motion for a mistrial. Id. at 1429, 1430. Ultimately, Joseph
did not file a motion for a mistrial, nor did he alert the trial court
to the juror's actions. Id. at 1430.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Weatherwax's conviction on the direct appeal. Id. at 1427.
Then, Weatherwax filed a habeas corpus petition with the district
court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and other issues not
relevant to this appeal. Id. The district court dismissed Weatherwax's petition. Id. On the first appeal of the habeas corpus, the
Third Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the matter to
the district court for an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
On remand, the district court determined that Joseph rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a voir
dire inquiry into and by failing to consult with or heed Weatherwax's directions regarding the issue of jury prejudice. Id. at 1431.
The district court also determined that Joseph had breached his
duty to the trial court. Id. at 1438. Accordingly, the district court
granted Weatherwax's petition. Id. at 1427. The government appealed the district court's decision. Id. at 1426.
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to deny
the petition. Id. at 1438. Judge Stapleton, delivering the majority
opinion, reviewed the analysis of the district court and arrived at a
different conclusion. Id. at 1431. Judge Lewis offered a dissenting
opinion challenging the majority's analysis of the issues. Id. at
1438 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Judge Stapleton began the majority opinion by noting that the
circuit court must make an independent determination whether
the facts found by the district court constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1430-31 (citing McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1
F.3d 159, 166 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 645 (1993)). Then,
the judge began the court's analysis by reviewing the standards for
judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1431.
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Judge Stapleton stated that judicial scrutiny of an attorney's conduct must be highly deferential, without the benefit of hindsight.
Id. The judge observed that a petitioner must overcome a court's
strong presumption that the attorney's performance was reasonable under the circumstances and "'might be considered sound
trial strategy."' Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688-89 (1984) (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
(1955))).
Continuing, Judge Stapleton explained the constitutional requirement of assistance of counsel be "'reasonable"' considering
all of the circumstances and the ultimate objective of assuring
"'vigorous advocacy of the defendants's cause."' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Further, Judge Stapleton stated that the
determination of reasonableness begins "with a 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689). Accordingly, Judge Stapleton noted that professional standards do not define the limits of constitutional assistance of counsel but merely afford guidance for evaluating the performance of
the assistance. Id.
The court next discussed the Strickland principles relative to
counsel's duty to investigate and make strategic choices regarding
a matter. Id. Judge Stapleton observed that the Strickland Court
opined that an attorney's duty includes making reasonable investigations of, or reasonable decisions against, investigating a particular matter. Id. at 1432. Furthermore, Judge Stapleton reported
that the Strickland Court posited that decisions against investigating
must be evaluated for reasonableness under all of the circumstances, but with great deference to the attorney's judgments. Id.
Applying the Supreme Court's holding to the facts of the case
at bar, Judge Stapleton observed that Joseph had not made a complete investigation before his strategic choice not to file a motion
for a mistrial. Id. Judge Stapleton noted that Joseph had not inquired whether any of the jurors were influenced by or had even
read the article. Id. Judge Stapleton, however, acknowledged that
Joseph could not have conducted an investigation of the matter
without first alerting the trial court to the newspaper matter. Id.
The court recognized that Joseph's control over whether the
seated jury would decide the case would then have been partly relinquished to the trial court. Id. Thus, Judge Stapleton posited
that Joseph acted in Weatherwax's best interest. Id. More specifically, the court stated thatJoseph's decision was based on his belief
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that the jury was the best possible jury to judge Weatherwax's actions. Id. Judge Stapleton declared that many competent litigators, under the same circumstances, would have made the same
decision. Id. Therefore, the majority concluded that Joseph's decision against further investigations was not an unreasonable strategic choice. Id.
Next, the circuit court addressed the district court's contention that Joseph's failure to follow directions from or fully consult
with Weatherwax amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
at 1433. Judge Stapleton reported that, generally, criminal defendants and their counsel split the decision-making authority regarding the handling of the defense. Id. The majority noted that the
Supreme Court has provided guidance assisting courts narrowing
this general proposition. Id. The Supreme Court, Judge Stapleton
observed, held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
provide a criminal defendant with a right to an appeal, but not
with a constitutional right to demand that appellate counsel raise
every non-frivolous argument espoused by the defendant. Id. (citingJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983)). The court observed
that the Jones Court recognized that the defendant "'has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding
the case."' Id. (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 751). Continuing, Judge
Stapleton recited the Jones Court's examples of "fundamental decisions" as decisions concerning the plea to be entered, whether to
waive the rights to a jury trial or to counsel, and whether to testify
or to take an appeal. Id. Next, Judge Stapleton explained that the
Jones Court reserved for the client decisions concerning fundamental matters, while similarly recognizing that non-fundamental decisions were reserved for counsel's professional judgment after
consulting with the client. Id. at 1433-34.
Next, the court addressed non-fundamental decisions. Id. at
1434-35. Judge Stapleton reported that the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice listed non-fundamental decisions as those conceming cross-examinations, jurors, and trial motions. Id. at 1434.
Moreover, Judge Stapleton observed that several courts defined
non-fundamental decisions to include witness selection. Id. Other
circuit courts recently rejected claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the court noted, when the trial counsel made strategic decisions about non-fundamental issues of moving for a mistrial and
evidence against the client's wishes. Id.
Judge Stapleton asserted that those decisions deemed to be
"fundamental" related directly to the goals of the representation,
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specifically what plea to enter or whether to appeal. Id. The majority opined that decisions relating to the objectives of the representation must be made solely by the defendant after receiving
complete and careful advice from counsel. Id. Although counsel
can inform the defendant of the likely consequences resulting
from the decisions, Judge Stapleton reasoned, only the defendant
can know what consequences can be tolerated. Id.
Certain other fundamental decisions, Judge Stapleton asserted, could be considered strategic choices. Id. The court posited that decisions involving the rights to assistance of counsel, a
jury trial, or to testify relate to the means of obtaining the objectives of the representation. Id. The majority emphasized, however,
that these decisions are very personal and crucial to the defendant's fate. Id. Accordingly, Judge Stapleton concluded that these
decisions are equivalent to the decisions relating to the objectives
of representation. Id.
Following that analysis, the court concluded that Joseph's decision against alerting the trial court to the newspaper incident was
not a fundamental decision. Id. First, Judge Stapleton determined
that the decision was not related directly to the goals of Joseph's
representation. Id. Rather,Judge Stapleton posited, Joseph's decisions related to the means of obtaining the objectives of the representation. Id. Secondly, the court found that the decision was not
so personal that it was equivalent to a decision relating to the
objectives of representation. Id. Instead, Judge Stapleton opined,
Joseph's decision involved whether to object to juror conduct. Id.
The court determined that Joseph's decision, while not a fundamental decision, was comparable to a strategic choice against objecting to inadmissible hearsay evidence. Id. at 1436. The majority
compared the consequences of the two situations. Id. Although
counsel has the ability to prevent the jury from learning information outside of the judicial system, Judge Stapleton asserted, counsel may make the strategic decision not to object. Id. Rejecting the
district court's suggestion, Judge Stapleton argued that either way,
the defendant's right to trial by jury was not implicated. Id. Accordingly, Judge Stapleton opined, in both situations the decisions
are for counsel, and if counsel has a rational basis for the decision,
a court has no authority to second-guess counsel's professional
judgment. Id.
Continuing, the court announced that it must further inquire
whetherJoseph consulted with Weatherwax before making his strategic decision. Id. Judge Stapleton concluded that the conversa-
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tion between Joseph and Weatherwax on the last day of the trial
was not a failure to consult. Id. Judge Stapleton asserted that while
the conversation was brief, it was complete considering the circumstances. Id. Judge Stapleton determined that Joseph listened
to the reports and views of Weatherwax and his family, expressed
his own view of the situation, and explained the reasons supporting
his view. Id. Furthermore,Judge Stapleton noted that Weatherwax
and his family complained that Joseph did not file a motion, not
that Joseph had not listened to them. Id.
Next, the court discussed the important purposes served by
client consultation before counsel's strategic decisions. Id. Judge
Stapleton identified the first purpose as insurance that the client
will be able to assist in the defense. Id. Secondly, Judge Stapleton
explained, the client's views and desires are relevant considerations
to be evaluated by counsel. Id. The court identified the third purpose as promoting a cooperative relationship between counsel and
the client. Id. Because of Weatherwax's opportunity to share ideas
and information with Joseph about the newspaper incident, the
court found no threat to the fulfillment of any of the purposes. Id.
The court noted an additional purpose occasionally arising
from the consultation between counsel and the client. Id. at 143637. Judge Stapleton explained that a consultation provides the client with the opportunity to learn about counsel's strategic choices
and to consider whether different representation is appropriate.
Id. at 1437. Because Joseph did not convey a final answer to Weatherwax, the court extended its discussion of this fourth purpose. Id.
The court explained that counsel's constitutional obligation of
consultation before making strategic decisions requires only that
counsel proceed reasonably under the circumstances. Id. Accordingly, Judge Stapleton recognized that it will be unreasonable in
many instances at trial for consultation to occur prior to the decision due to the non-existence of an opportunity or to lack of value
to be gained. Id. Also, the court noted, that counsel may reasonably decide not to discuss the final decision following a previous
consultation and the option of changing representation is unrealistic. Id. Judge Stapleton reasoned that in many trial situations, the
import of the issue in disagreement cannot be expected to provoke
a change in representation. Id. In other situations, Judge Stapleton declared, a change in representation is not an option because
the court would not grant it at that point in the proceedings. Id.
Judge Stapleton stated that with the facts in the case at hand,
the court could not say that Joseph acted unreasonably, in light of
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the circumstances, by failing to tell Weatherwax of his decision
concerning the newspaper incident. Id. Further, Judge Stapleton
asserted that any reasonable attorney in Joseph's situation would
not have believed that Weatherwax would sincerely consider
changing representation or that the court would have allowed a
representation change at that point in the proceedings. Id. Judge
Stapleton stated that after discussing the alternatives of the strategic decision with Weatherwax, Joseph made a reasonable decision
that was ultimately his to make. Id. at 1438. Therefore, the court
declared, Weatherwax failed to overcome the presumption of Joseph's acceptable performance. Id.
As a final matter, the circuit court addressed the district
court's determination that Joseph had breached his duty to the
trial court. Id. Judge Stapleton would not express an opinion
whether Joseph had a duty to the trial court to report the newspaper incident. Id. Because Joseph acted in the best interests of
Weatherwax as he saw them, Judge Stapleton determined that
there was no reason for a reversal of Weatherwax's conviction. Id.
Thus, the court held that any breach of some duty owed by Joseph
to the trial court would not support the district court's grant of the
petition. Id.
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Lewis asserted that contrary
to the majority's opinion, the correct focus of the analysis was the
assessment of the underlying assumptions of Joseph's decision. Id.
at 1439 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis argued that Joseph's
sole motivation for failing to report the newspaper incident to the
trial court was race. Id. at 1441 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis
emphasized that not only was Joseph's race-based assumption unreasonable under professional norms, it was explicitly rejected by
the Supreme Court. Id. at 1438 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). Concluding, Judge Lewis
criticized Joseph's decision as professionally unreasonable because
of the risk to Weatherwax's right to a neutral jury. Id. at 1441
(Lewis, J., dissenting).
The Third Circuit followed the Supreme Court's admonition
to courts to be highly deferential to decisions by counsel. The
Court recognized that while hindsight may be 20-20, it is unhelpful
in determining whether a decision made in the heat of the moment was reasonable. The Third Circuit has provided another
layer of protection for clients by allowing courts to further scrutinize certain decisions when analyzing the reasonableness of a decision. To second-guess each decision by an attorney would clog
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courts unnecessarily, but to allow a criminal defendant to be punished due to the ineffective assistance of counsel would be appalling to the Constitution. The Third Circuit has sensibly delineated
those decisions that counsel can act on without the agreement of
the client and those that counsel must consult with and even abide
by the client's wishes. This delineation ensures that courts can
move along and yet still be protective client rights. Although the
concerns raised by the dissent were not specifically addressed by
the majority, they remain valid in light of Batson and its progeny.
For now, however, decisions by counsel based on race are reasonable outside the realm of peremptory challenges.
Julia L. Luongo

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PLAINTIFF

MUST

PRODUCE

SPECIFIC

Evi-

DENCE OF CAUSATION TO WITHSTAND A MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT-Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines Ltd., 682 F.3d 69
(3d Cir. 1996)
Elizabeth Fedorczyk, sailed aboard the Royal Caribbean's vessel, Sovereign, from Miami. 682 F.3d 69, 72. While on the cruise
ship, Fedorczyk sunned herself after applying sunscreen and swam
in the pool. Id. After approximately two hours on deck, she returned to her cabin where she began showering. Id. While in the
bathtub Fedorczyk began soaping herself when she slipped and fell
to the floor. Id.
Though Royal Caribbean affixed a grab rail to each tub,
Fedorczyk failed to reach this device. Id. The cruise line also adhered four abrasive strips to the tub's floor, yet Fedorczyk could
not recall if she placed her feet on the protective devices. Id. Subsequently, Fedorczyk returned to the scene of the accident and discovered that her feet fit between the abrasive strips. Id.
Fedorczyk introduced the expert testimony of an architect
who testified that Royal Caribbean did not adequately secure the
passenger's safety because of the great space between the abrasive
strips. Id. The expert based his testimony on Royal Caribbean's
failure to comply with safety standards for slip resistant tubs set
forth by the Consumer Products Safety Commission. Id. The expert concluded that the deviation from the safety standard was the

1802

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1774

direct cause of Fedorczyk's fall. Id. Nevertheless, Fedorczyk's expert conceded that one cannot prevent all slips. Id. The expert
further noted that the presence of soap and oil constitute variables
which alter the safety of tubs. Id.
The cruise line moved for summary judgment claiming that
Fedorczyk failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support her
claim. Id. On June 26, 1995, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey entered an order granting Royal Caribbean's motion. Id. A divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
Id.
Writing for the majority, Judge Cowen first addressed the issue
of which substantive law applied. Id. at 73. As the accident occurred upon navigable waters, the court noted that admiralty jurisdiction could be applicable. Id. The court recalled that Fedorczyk
filed her complaint in state court, yet, Royal Caribbean successfully
sought removal to federal court based upon diversity of citizenship
where a court applies the law of the forum state. Id. Judge Cowen
explained that when a claim exists under the district court's admiralty jurisdiction in addition to another jurisdictional basis, the
plaintiff may choose the preferable jurisdiction. Id. (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(h)). The court reminded that the plaintiff must, however,
include a statement in the pleadings affirmatively invoking the
court's admiralty jurisdiction. Id. (citing Bodden v. Osgood, 879
F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1989)). The court noted that Fedorczyk
never sought the application of admiralty law and stated her satisfaction with diversity based jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, the panel
applied New Jersey law. Id.
Judge Cowen next addressed the merits of Fedorczyk's negligence claim, emphasizing that the plaintiff must prove both negligence and causation. Id. The judge instructed that causation
includes two components, cause in fact and legal or proximate
cause. Id. Cause in fact exists when a party's act or omission materially contributed to the events leading to an accident, the court
explained. Id. When several potential causes exist, the court reasoned, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant's actions were a substantial factor in causing the harm. Id. at
73-4 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(2) (1965)). The
court concluded that in light of Fedorczyk's expert's admission
that soap and oil comprise variables that might cause a fall, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the cruise line's negligence constituted a substantial factor in causing her fall. Id. at 74. Noting that
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Fedorczyk introduced only circumstantial evidence, the majority
stated that such proof must be strong enough to allow a jury to
infer negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citations
omitted). The court distinguished proving negligence by circumstantial evidence from the operation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Id. When the occurrence bespeaks negligence, the
defendant exercises exclusive control over the instrumentality of
the accident, or there is no indication of the plaintiffs fault, the
court acknowledged, res ipsa loquitur may apply. Id. Judge Cowen
advised that the operation of the doctrine involves shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to rebut the inference of negligence. Id. The majority concluded, nonetheless, that application
of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to Fedorczyk's accident. Id.
The majority then reviewed the circumstantial evidence
presented by Fedorczyk. Id. Specifically, the court examined
Fedorczyk's proof that her feet fit between the adhesive strips. Id.
at 75. Judge Cowen emphasized that the court must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Fedorczyk. Id. Nevertheless, the court refused to infer that Fedorczyk stood between the
strips. Id. The court reasoned that the possibility that Fedorczyk's
feet fit between the strips was insufficient to prove her foot position. Id. (citing Dombrowska v. Kresge-Newark, Inc., 75 N.J. Super.
271 (App. Div. 1962)).
Moreover, the majority determined that Fedorczyk's expert's
testimony was inadmissible. Id. The court found that the expert
based the opinion on speculation and, accordingly, struck the testimony. Id. (citing McCormick on Evidence, § 13 at 56 n.15 (John
William Strong, ed. 1992)). Finding that Fedorczyk proffered no
evidence tending to prove that Royal Caribbean's allegedly defective stripping caused her accident, the court felt compelled to affirm summary judgment in favor of the cruise line. Id. at 75-6
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B (1965)).
Concluding that Fedorczyk adduced sufficient evidence of
causation, Judge Stapleton dissented. Id. at 76 (Stapleton, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge reminded that one cannot prove
causation with mathematical certainty and would reverse the case
at bar and remand for trial. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 433B (1965)). Noting that the trier of fact may rely upon
ordinary experience to infer causation, Judge Stapleton concluded
that a jury might decide that the fall resulted from unsafe conditions in the tub. Id.
The Third Circuit's opinion reiterated the importance of
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proving causation, an essential element of any negligence claim.
Defendants should find solace in the court's decision, reaffirming
that a plaintiff will not reach a jury on speculative evidence. The
court further served the interests of judicial economy by granting
summary judgment on such a claim. Potential plaintiffs must offer
a modicum of proof before a jury will consider the matter.
ChristineA. McAteer

TORTS-PRODUCTS LiAPnrI-A COMPONENT PART MANUFACTURER
THAT PROVIDES A SYSTEM COMPONENT AS SPECIFIED BY THE PURCHASER, AND WHICH Is NOT DANGEROUS UNTIL INTEGRATED
INTO THE LARGER SYSTEM, CANNOT BE HELD STRICTLY LIABLE
TO INJURED PARTIES FOR THE SYSTEM'S LACK OF SAFETY DEVICES
AND WARNINGS-Zaza v. Marquess and Nell, Inc. and Interna-

tional Sheet Metal& Plate Mfg., Inc., No.A-63, 1996 WL 233974
(N.J. May 9, 1996).
On January 28, 1990, plaintiff Gerardo Zaza detected a clog in
a quench tank at the Hoboken plant of his employer, Maxwell
House Coffee ("Maxwell House"). No.A-63, 1996 WL 233974, at *1.
While attempting to repair the tank, hot molten water and carbon
overflowed from the tank and poured onto the plaintiff's back,
arms and upper extremities. As a result, the plaintiff received second degree burns over twenty-one percent of his body.
Maxwell House produces decaffeinated coffee beans through
the use of a large and complex manufacturing process known as
the trecar-carbon regeneration system. In order for the system to
work properly, many various parts must be fully integrated and assembled. One such integral part is a quench tank, which is used to
flow a carbon-water mixture, possibly up to 1700 degrees fahrenheit, into storage tanks.
Maxwell House prepared the initial designs for the quench
tank and submitted them to the engineering firm of Marquess and
Nell, Inc. ("Marquess"). Marquess drew up the final design plans

and contracted with. defendant International Sheet Metal & Plate
Mfg., Inc. ("International") to supply a fabricated quench tank.
Maxwell House also hired other experts to assemble and integrate
the entire system and to prepare training materials and conduct a
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training session, which Zaza attended, on the operation and use of
the system.
The specifications for the quench tank did not require International to install any safety devices. Instead, the finalized system
was to incorporate three safety devices designed to prevent an overflow from the quench tank. International had no role in the
planned installation of the three safety devices. Ultimately, Maxwell House decided to omit the safety devices recommended by
Marquess and none were in operation when the plaintiff sustained
his injuries.
Zaza subsequently filed suit against Marquess and International. Zaza alleged that strict liability should be imposed against
International because the quench tank was designed defectively
and lacked appropriate warnings. Id. at *2. The trial court granted
International's motion for summary judgment. Id. at *3. The trial
court, reasoning that the applicable standard for the creator of a
component part of a machine is whether or not that component
part had been manufactured properly, found that the work done
by International did not cause the tank to be used without adequate safety devices. Id.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
reversed the lower court's dismissal. Id. at *4.The appellate division held that International had a duty to warn foreseeable users of
the potential dangers of operating the quench tank without safety
devices, even though it was not International's duty to install any
safety devices. Id. International appealed to the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Id.
Justice Garibaldi, joined by Chief Justice Wilentz, Justice Pollock andJustice Stein, authored the majority opinion. Id. at *1,*17.
Justice Garibaldi began the analysis by focusing on whether the
Products Liability Act ("the Act") imposes a legal duty on the producer of a non-defective component part to ensure that the installer-assembler and owner properly integrate the part into the
system. Id. at *4-5 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1 to -7 (1996)).
The court noted that the legislature intended to limit manufacturers' liability under the Act in an effort to balance the interests of
the persons involved and of the public "with a view towards economic reality." Id. at *5 (quoting Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 219
N.J.Super. 601,643, 561 A.2d 511 (1987) (Shebell, J.A.D., dissenting), rev'd., 116 N.J. 155 (1989)). Toward this end, the court
stated, the Act specifically provides for strict liability against a manufacturer or seller when the product deviated from design specifi-
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cations or performance standards when the product lacked
adequate warnings or instructions or when the product was
designed defectively. Id. at *5 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-2
(1996)).
In applying the statutory language of the Act, Justice Garibaldi
considered whether International manufactured the quench tank
in a defective condition. Id. at *6. In so doing, the justice offered
the following considerations for guidance. Id. First, the majority
proffered that liability should be imposed on a manufacturer only
when it is responsible for the defective condition. Id (citing Taylor

v. Paul 0. Abbe, Inc., 516 F.2d 145,147 (3d Cir. 1975)). Further,
the majority expressed that defectiveness may not be inferred
merely from the fact that somebody was injured. Id. Instead, the
majority stated that strict products liability is ultimately determined
by looking at whether the manufacturer was reasonably prudent in
designing and constructing the product. Id. (citing Feldman v.

Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429,451, 479 A.2d 374 (1984)). As another
consideration, the majority explained that the manufacturer of a

component part is typically not strictly liable when the part is subject to further processing or some form of substantial change. Id. at
*8 (citing Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J.
386,399, 451 A.2d 179(1982)).
After discussing these guidelines and reciting supporting precedent from other jurisdictions and from the American Law Institution, Justice Garibaldi asserted the court's holding that the
quench tank was not designed defectively and that International
did not have a duty to install safety devices on the tank before sending it to Maxwell House. Id. at *6-*10 (citations omitted). The
court based its holding on the plaintiff's failure to offer any evidence that the tank was in a defective condition when Maxwell
House received it or that International knew or should have known
that safety devices would not be installed by Maxwell House. Id. at
*10.

The court found that the manufacturer of a component part
which is not inherently dangerous by itself generally has no control
over whether the component part is properly installed into the final system when installation of safety devices by the component
part manufacturer would not be feasible. Id. at *7. Similarly, the
majority found that "it was not feasible, practical or reasonable" for
International to attach any safety devices to the tank because it
lacked the proper equipment, facilities and prior experience necessary in the assembly of trecar-carbon regeneration systems and
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because there was no suitable location on the tank for a warning to
be placed. Id. Furthermore, the majority noted that integration of
the quench tank into the finalized system constituted a substantial
change to the tank. Id. Finally, Justice Garibaldi averred that the
design plans called for the safety devices to be provided by Maxwell
House and its hired assemblers. Id. The majority opined that International acted reasonably in relying on these plans. Id. at *11. In
accordance with these findings, the court concluded that "International acted in a reasonably prudent manner in fabricating the
quench tank and in delivering it to Maxwell House without incorporating the safety devices." Id.
After holding that International was not strictly liable for failing to install safety devices, the court next considered whether International was strictly liable for failing to warn of the dangers of
operating the tank without any safety devices. Id. The Act requires
a manufacturer to give an adequate product warning in which a
"reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances
would have provided with respect to the danger." Id. at *12. In
defining an adequate warning in this way, the court rationalized
that the manufacturer of a component part should not be strictly
liable for failure to warn when the danger involved is not foreseeable. Id.
The court noted that in a majority of jurisdictions, the manufacturer of a non-defective component part does not have a duty to
warn the subsequent assembler of any potential danger which may
arise, nor does the manufacturer have a duty to warn employees of
the immediate purchaser when the purchaser is aware of the need
to install safety devices. Id. at *13 (citations omitted).
Holding International liable, the court expounded, would impose an unfair duty on a component part manufacturer to investigate whether the use of its product would become dangerous upon
its integration into a larger, complex system assembled by experts.
Id. at *14. Accordingly, the court explained that International acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted if faced with
the same or similar circumstances. Id. at *15. Therefore, the court
held that International could not be strictly liable to an injured
employee of a purchaser of its product for failure to warn of the
potential dangers of operating the tank. Id. at *15-*16. Justice Garibaldi concluded the majority opinion by stating that holding International liable would have result in unreasonably expanding the
law of products liability. Id. at *16. Finding no duty to warn, the
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majority declined to address the issue of whether failure to warn
proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. Id.
Justice Coleman filed a separate opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part in whichJustice Handler andJustice O'Hern
joined. Id. at *17 (ColemanJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Coleman agreed with the majority that International
was not strictly liable for failing to install safety devices or for failing
to ensure that Maxwell House installed them. Id. The justice, however, disagreed with the majority's assertion that International had
no duty to place a warning on the tank to alert intended users of
potential dangers of its use without safety devices. Id. The justice
based this dissent on the uncontested fact that International knew
that the three proposed safety devices were intended to prevent an
overflow, but also was aware that the tank and the system could be
used without any safety devices and thus, constituted a danger. Id.
Justice Coleman argued that it was practical and feasible for
International to have placed a warning on the tank. Id. at *18
(Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice disagreed with the majority's conclusion that there was no suitable location on the tank for a warning and suggested that the
additional cost of providing a warning would have been minimal.
Id. Moreover, the justice found the majority's analysis regarding
the feasibility of a warning to be misguided because the difficulty in
observing any warning on the tank and the cost associated with
providing a warning relate to whether a duty was breached as opposed to whether a duty existed in the first place. Id.
Justice Coleman then discussed whether International acted in
a reasonably prudent manner despite its failure to provide any
warnings. Id. In disagreeing with the majority's finding on this
question, the justice noted that despite the lack of any apparent
defect, any hidden danger associated with the product "constitutes
a distinct category of defect, separate from manufacturing and design defect... [which] makes a product inherently unsafe." Id. at
*18 (Colemanj., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You Even
Though I Didn't: Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus On Warning Law Is
Wrong, 61 TENN.L.REv. 1125, 1166 (1994)).
Justice Coleman further buttressed his argument by noting
precedent in New Jersey indicating that the failure to provide
safety devices or warnings constitutes a product defect giving rise to
strict liability, regardless of whether or not the product was manufactured in accordance with the plans and specifications of the pur-
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chaser. Id. at *19-*20 (Colemanj., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted). Underscoring that the public interest requires the builder of a component part to warn of the
dangers inherent in using the part without safety devices, the justice emphasized the point that International had a duty to warn the
employees of Maxwell House of the dangers inherent in the
quench tank. Id. at *20 (ColemanJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice concluded his separate opinion by
stating that International's failure to warn of any dangers was the
proximate cause of Zaza's injuries because Zaza is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he would have heeded a warning. Id. at
*21 (ColemanJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In a zeal to limit the potential liability of products manufacturers, the majority opinion disregarded the basic purpose of strict
products liability: to protect individuals from unsafe products. In
order to be held strictly liable, a manufacturer must breach a duty
to the product's intended users and that breach must be the proximate cause of an injury. The majority asserted that International
did not even have a duty because the company acted in a reasonably prudent manner. As the separate opinion correctly observed,
However, International knew that the quench tank would be fully
functional even without any safety devices and knew that the tank
was likely to overflow without the installation of safety devices.
Under such circumstances, it hardly sounds reasonably prudent for
International to have ignored the potential for injury and to have
refrained from spending the minimal time and effort required in
placing a warning on the tank.
John Marmaras

